In November 2025, Suomen Lehdistö magazine reported that Hämeen Sanomat and Aamulehti newspapers had shut down their Facebook discussions due to an avalanche of inappropriate comments. Large numbers of comments had been posted especially on Facebook shares dealing with national and foreign policy. At Hämeen Sanomat, suspicions arose that not all commenters were genuine people. Many commenter profiles used a numerical code instead of a name, had very few followers, and featured profile pictures that appeared to be fabricated. In an opinion piece, the editor-in-chief of Hämeen Sanomat said that trolls flooding Facebook were seeking to provoke people and spread disinformation. [1]
Based on publicly available information, the newspapers had not conducted a thorough investigation of where the comments came from and whether they were accompanied by inauthentic behaviour. Elsewhere in Europe, it is known that Russia has exploited the comment sections of journalistic media to disseminate its own propaganda. [2]
Finland is not permanently shielded
Amid the geopolitical turmoil of the 2020s, Finland has largely held its ground against foreign information manipulation. Although Finland has been a target of Russian hybrid operations, the effects of propaganda have remained limited. Finland has been protected by high levels of societal trust, strong media literacy, and a difficult language. Russia’s activities in Finland have also been hampered by the expulsion of intelligence officers from diplomatic missions.
However, media organizations should not become complacent. In the 2025 elections, Russia carried out large-scale influence operations targeting other EU countries, aimed at deepening existing societal divisions, disrupting elections, and eroding support for Ukraine.
Ahead of the German federal elections, the Storm-1516 operation, linked to Russia’s military intelligence agency GRU, created one hundred fake news websites in German. In the Czech Republic, TikTok removed 178,000 inauthentic accounts linked to foreign election interference. In Romania and Moldova, discussion forums were flooded with AI-driven bots that steered voters toward pro-Russian parties opposing the EU and NATO.
According to the definition established by the European External Action Service (EEAS), such activities are referred to as foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). A newly published report commissioned by Mediapooli brings together the situation in Finland and neighbouring countries regarding media influence operations conducted by Russia and China. The report also includes an illustrative diagram for identifying information manipulation, as well as recommendations for strengthening cooperation within the media sector to counter such influence—particularly from the perspective of crisis and emergency situations.
It is important that journalistic media participate in identifying, monitoring, and investigating foreign information manipulation and interference. By exposing where information manipulation originates and what kinds of networks and objectives lie behind it, news organizations can strengthen society’s resilience in times of crisis. At the same time, they enhance their audiences’ media literacy and understanding of the information manipulation environment.
The possible inauthenticity of Facebook commenting is one example of an activity that could be investigated by an appropriately resourced and trained editorial team. If orchestrated information manipulation and interference were revealed in the background, its motives and tactics could also be explained to readers.
New actors: China, artificial intelligence, and the United States
Russian influence operations have been monitored in Finland to a relatively significant extent. China, by contrast, has received less attention, even though its hybrid influence activities have intensified in recent years. [3]
China’s primary targets of influence are Taiwan, the Chinese diaspora, and the United States. Nevertheless, covert influence operations traced to China or Chinese actors have also been detected online in Finland and neighbouring countries. The Paperwall network of news sites—linked to a Chinese PR firm—has been reported to publish machine-translated news content that echoes propaganda narratives disseminated in Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. [4]
In Sweden, China’s former ambassador repeatedly contacted newsrooms and even criticized individual journalists for their reporting on China. [5] Elsewhere, fake social media accounts linked to China’s Spamouflage operation have reportedly encouraged Americans to take part in protests, spread AI-generated disinformation, and even circulate AI-generated sexual imagery targeting critics of the Chinese Communist Party. [6]
The United States dismantled several mechanisms and shut down government units in 2025 that had been intended to curb the spread of foreign and domestic disinformation. At the same time, U.S.-based social media platforms have reduced fact-checking and content moderation. Decisions made in the United States may increase the opportunities for hostile information manipulation and interference by Russia and China in Europe as well.
At the same time, the development of large AI language models has significantly weakened the protective shield that a small and complex language once provided Finland against foreign manipulation. It is now possible for virtually anyone to produce convincing Finnish-language text and AI-generated videos on any topic. As has been seen elsewhere in Europe, artificial intelligence has expanded the toolkit of information manipulation and interference and multiplied its scale.
As an increasing share of audiences, especially younger ones, consume their news via short-form video platforms and other social media channels, the situation calls for greater attention and new capabilities from newsrooms. Below are three tips to help media organisations better prepare for foreign information manipulation and interference.
- Enhancing journalists’ OSINT skills. OSINT refers to open source intelligence. OSINT tools and techniques are effective aids for investigative journalists, for example in analysing social media content and identifying foreign information manipulation and interference. There is a wide range of OSINT tools and skills, including the use of reverse image search to verify the authenticity of images and videos, the ability to investigate background information on websites, and the skills needed to analyse social media profiles, satellite imagery, and different types of maps.
- Systematic monitoring of claims circulating online. Countering information manipulation begins with monitoring the claims, narratives, and activities that spread online. This should also be done in peacetime. Monitoring is a prerequisite for detecting and identifying influence operations early and for noticing when something unusual is happening online. For example, ahead of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the tone and narratives of messages originating from Russia were observed to grow increasingly aggressive. [7]
- Sharing expertise between newsrooms. Domestic media naturally compete with one another for readers and advertising revenue. Responding to foreign information manipulation and interference, however, is a shared challenge where cooperation can be beneficial. One example of inter-newsroom cooperation can be found in Norway, where the fact-checking organization Faktisk, jointly funded by media companies, has been operating for several years. After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Faktisk established a service called Verifiserbar, which uses OSINT techniques to analyse the authenticity of images and videos related in particular to conflicts and to strengthen journalists’ OSINT expertise in Norway. Verifiserbar supports newsrooms in preventing the inadvertent publication of disinformation or propaganda. Its verifications are made available to media organizations through a shared media bank, similar to the services provided by STT.
Authors
Pipsa Havula
Pipsa Havula is a freelance journalist and trainer specializing in fact-checking and information manipulation. She has worked as a staff journalist and/or written as a freelancer for outlets including Ilta-Sanomat, Suomen Kuvalehti, Suomen Lehdistö, Apu, and Faktabaari.
Joonas Pörsti
Joonas Pörsti is the editor-in-chief of Faktabaari and specializes in foreign information manipulation and international politics. His non-fiction book Propagandan lumo – Sata vuotta mielten hallintaa (“The Allure of Propaganda: One Hundred Years of Controlling Minds”) was awarded the Finnish State Award for Public Information in 2018.
Sources:
[1] Virranta Riikka, “Hämeen Sanomat ja Aamulehti sulkivat Facebook-keskustelunsa kommenttivyöryjen vuoksi – Olivatko keskustelijat aitoja ihmisiä?”, Suomen Lehdistö, 13.11.2025
[2] Cardiff University, “How a Kremlin-Linked Influence Operation is Systematically Manipulating Western Media to Construct and Communicate Disinformation”, 6.9.2021
[3] Petteri Jouko, Marko Palokangas (toim.), "Hybridisodankäynti: laaja-alaista vaikuttamista moninaisilla sodankäyntimenetelmillä", Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, 2024
[4] Alberto Fittarelli, “PAPERWALL Chinese Websites Posing as Local News Outlets Target Global Audiences with Pro-Beijing Content”, Citizen Lab, 7.2.2024
[5] International Federation of Journalists, “Sweden: Chinese embassy threatens Swedish journalist”, 15.4.2021
[6] Mandiant, "Pro-PRC DRAGONBRIDGE Influence Campaign Targets Rare Earths Mining Companies in Attempt to Thwart Rivalry to PRC Market Dominance", 28.6.2022 ; Government of Canada, “Rapid Response Mechanism Canada detects second ‘Spamouflage’ campaign targeting Canada-based Chinese-language commentators and their families”, 6.3.2025
[7] Jakub Kalenský, Roman Osadchuk, "Hybrid CoE Research Report 11: How Ukraine fights Russian disinformation: Beehive vs mammoth", Tammikuu 2024